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Abstract—Crowdsensing requires scalable privacy-preserving
authentication that allows users to send anonymously sensing
reports, while enabling eventual anonymity revocation in case
of user misbehavior. Previous research efforts already provide
efficient mechanisms that enable conditional privacy through
pseudonym systems, either based on Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) or Group Signature (GS) schemes. However, previous
schemes do not enable users to self-generate an unlimited number
of pseudonyms per user to enable users to participate in diverse
sensing tasks simultaneously, while preventing the users from
participating in the same task under different pseudonyms, which
is referred to as sybil attack. This paper addresses this issue by
providing a scalable privacy-preserving authentication solution
for crowdsensing, based on a novel pseudonym-based signature
scheme that enables unlinkable-yet-accountable pseudonymity.
The paper provides a detailed description of the proposed scheme,
the security analysis, the performance evaluation, and details of
how it is implemented and integrated into a real crowdsensing
platform.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Context awareness and environmental information gath-
ering is a cornerstone component in Smart Cities, since it
facilitates the intelligent management of urban subsystems,
responsible for energy, water, public lighting, transportation,
or environmental control [1],[2],[3]. In a standard deploy-
ment, this environmental data is obtained through pre-installed
data collection stations provisioned with dedicated sensing
systems. However, mobile crowdsensing shifts this anchored
data collection paradigm towards a mobile user-centric dis-
tributed sensing network [4],[5]. Information is gathered and
transmitted directly by users’ handsets, hence allowing the
management systems in the Smart City to use measurements
taken at the ideal locations, which is where the citizens actually
are. On the citizens’ side, user participation can be fostered
through incentive programmes, where users are rewarded for
their contribution to the crowdsensing tasks [6].
Crowdsensing caters for outstanding benefits in terms of
increased data accuracy and decreased deployment cost, but it
also brings a security challenge in terms of trust between the
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Smart City and crowdsensing participants. From the Smart City
perspective the security concern is twofold. Firstly, sensors
are distributed and carried be citizens who could be malicious
users sensing fake data or honest users with defective sensors.
Secondly, citizens are rewarded for contributing to the sensing
tasks, and hence selfish users could submit their reports several
times to increase their profits. From the citizens’ perspective
the main concern is the location privacy, since crowdsensing
participants submit sensing data together with geolocation
information [7]. Thus the Smart City can identify and locate
citizens, which can discourage citizens from participating in
the sensing tasks [8],[9],[10].
Previous works have addressed these challenges by propos-
ing conditional privacy-preserving authentication mechanisms
based on pseudonym systems. Citizens submit authenticated
sensing reports using pseudonyms, which preserves citizens’
privacy, while enabling the Smart City to verify the sender’s
legitimacy to participate in the sensing task. The Smart City
can trigger the revocation of the users’ privacy privileges
in case of misuse, due to sensor malfunctioning or user
misconduct, and block the participation of dishonest users
in future sensing tasks. In cases of severe misbehaviour,
the Smart City may also demand user de-anonymization and
prosecution. Also, selfish users can be avoided by controlling
the pseudonym generation process, to ensure that only one
pseudonym per user is allowed in each sensing task. On the
citizens side, pseudonyms from the same user are unlinkable
to each other, and renewed periodically or on a sensing task
basis, and hence they cannot be linked to the user’s identity
through statistical analysis [11]. However, current pseudonym
systems proposed for crowdsensing applications, mainly based
on Group Signature (GS) schemes [12],[13] or Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) [14],[6], do not provide a scalable mech-
anism to generate several unlinkable pseudonyms on the user
side while preventing selfish users from participating in the
same task several times.
More concretely, PKI-based systems do not enable
pseudonym self-generation on the user side. Citizens must
contact a Certification Authority (CA) periodically to obtain
and renew their pseudonyms [14]. Also, to prevent selfish users
a new pseudonym should be issued for each sensing task [6],
which might cause scalability problems in large deployments.
GS-based systems enable pseudonym self-generation on the
user side with a single credential issued from the CA, which
is more scalable than PKI-based solutions. However, GS-based
systems are limited to one pseudonym per user that is renewed
periodically in a time-slot basis [13],[15]. Thus, citizens cannot
hold several valid pseudonyms simultaneously. Although it is
possible to provide several credentials per user to enable users
to hold several unlinkable pseudonyms simultaneously [16], it
would not be possible to detect a selfish user participating in a
single sensing task with several pseudonyms. Other pseudonym
systems, based on Identity Based Cryptography (IBC), enable
the self-generation of several pseudonyms on the user side
with a single credential [17], but they also do not prevent
selfish users. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there
are no mechanisms in the state of the art that enable the
unlimited self-generation of unlinkable pseudonyms on the
user side while preventing selfish users from using more than
one pseudonym in the same task. It is worth mentioning
that previous privacy-preserving systems, providing anonymity
revocation, could link pseudonyms to the same credential and
detect selfish users. However, this would require to revoke
pseudonyms of all users, including honest users. This paper
provides an extensive review of current pseudonym systems
and crowdsensing privacy-preserving frameworks, in sections
II and IV, and describes the shortcomings for their application
in crowdsensing scenarios.
To address this security challenge, we introduce the concept
of unlinkable-yet-accountable pseudonymity. According to this
concept, users should be able to generate several pseudonyms
to participate, simultaneously, in several sensing tasks. Dif-
ferent pseudonyms generated from one credential cannot be
linked to the same credential, and different pseudonyms gen-
erated from one credential cannot be used for the same task.
This means that, from the system perspective, given a set of
pseudonyms it is not possible to know which pseudonyms
belong to the same credential, i.e. user. However, given a set
of pseudonyms used in a specific sensing task, it is certain
that each pseudonym belongs to a different credential, i.e. user.
Therefore, the unlinkable-yet-accountable feature enables users
to participate in several tasks simultaneously without these
tasks being linked to each other. Also it enables the Smart
City to be sure that users will not be able to participate in the
same sensing task with two or more different pseudonyms.
This paper proposes a novel pseudonym-based signa-
ture scheme, based on IBC, with unlinkable-yet-accountable
pseudonymity. The proposed scheme is resilient to attack
scenarios where selfish and dishonest users are present. The
proposed scheme is resilient to the following attack scenar-
ios: i) honest users with malfunctioning sensors transmitting
faulty data; ii) selfish users sending the same sensing report
multiple times to increase their rewards (which is known as
sybil attack [12],[18]); and iii) malicious users transmitting
fake data to mislead the sensing process (this attack can be
leveraged with a sybil attack). In the proposed scheme, the
unlinkable-yet-accountable feature is not achieved by means
of de-anonymizing or revoking users pseudonyms, hence it
preserves the privacy privileges of honest users. Additionally,
the proposed scheme also provides an efficient implementation
of an anonymity revocation mechanism, which is an essen-
tial component in crowdsensing applications, and one of the
current bottlenecks for the deployment of pseudonym-based
systems in real crowdsensing scenarios. The paper provides:
i) an extensive review on the state of the art; ii) detailed
construction of the proposed scheme; iii) the proof of security
of the proposed scheme; iv) complexity comparison between
the proposed scheme and previous schemes; v) performance
evaluation; and vi) shows how it is integrated into a real
crowdsensing system and implemented in a real Smart City
pilot in the city of Lisbon, Portugal.
II. RELATED WORK ON PSEUDONYM SYSTEMS
The notion of identity confidentiality was described by
Pfitzmann and Hansen [19] in their definition of anonymity.
In such definition, an entity belonging to set of entities is
considered to be in an anonymous state if it is not identifiable
within that set, i.e. there is no technique better than a random
guess, to evaluate the identity of the entity within the set.
Note, that according to such definition, subjects within the
anonymous set can interact freely with other entities, and the
only information that the other interacting party will get is
that the subject belongs to the set. However, in such a system
the lack of users’ identifiers makes its application challenging
in service oriented architectures, where user accounts and
sessions must be kept in a short, medium or even long term.
Moreover, fully anonymous systems can be jeopardized by
misusers that abuse their anonymous state to break the service
terms and conditions, hence the users’ privacy rights should
be conditional to the users’ behavior.
Pseudonyms provide a suitable means to keep the users’
sessions, since they can serve as identifiers for entities while
still preserving the anonymous state. Entities can hold many
pseudonyms representing the entity, its roles or functions, or
the different relations of the entity with different organizations
[20],[21]. Ideally, different pseudonyms of the same entity are
not linkable between each other and do not leak any informa-
tion about the entity’s real identity. Hence, an entity hiding
behind a pseudonym does not reveal any other information
than the fact that it belongs to the group of entities that are
entitled to use those pseudonyms. Also, a user can use many
pseudonyms and perform a cognitive procedure to drive the
pseudonym switching mechanism, which prevents pseudonym
tracking through statistical analysis [11]. Pseudonym systems
can also provide conditional privacy since they can enable the
revocation of the privacy rights of misusers and permit a trusted
authority to retrieve their real identities [16],[22]. However,
pseudonym systems can be implemented in multiple manners
and provide a diverse set of features:
A. Pseudonymity through digital anonymous credentials
Digital anonymous credential systems [23],[24] were pro-
posed to enable anonymous systems. In such systems, users are
granted anonymous credentials, which are composed of a blind
signature from a Certification Authority (CA) on a committed
value and an efficient mechanism for the credential holder
to prove the knowledge of such signature. The unlinkability
feature of the proof of knowledge of such signature (also
called signature of knowledge) allows credential holders to use
the credential multiple times towards a verifier without being
tracked and without revealing any other information than the
possession of such credential. There are mechanisms to create
pseudonyms between users and organizations and to link such
pseudonyms to the credential issued by the CA [21]. Also,
revocation mechanisms can be enabled in digital anonymous
credential systems [25]. However, in these works, pseudonyms
represent relations between organizations and users, hence the
creation of a pseudonym is a two party protocol that involves
linking a previous pseudonym with another organization to the
new one (also called transferring the credential). It is worth
mentioning the works [26],[15], which provide a construction
where the user proves for possession of an anonymous creden-
tial and links this credential to a valid token that can be seen as
a pseudonym. The scheme provides a time-based mechanism
where the tokens are renewed periodically. Although users
cannot choose to maintain the tokens, i.e. they are forced to
switch tokens periodically, a new token can be linked to a
previous one, hence it allows users to maintain anonymous
user sessions active. The downside of this approach for its
application in the crowdsensing scenario is that it does not
provide a revocation mechanism to support conditional privacy,
and it does not enable more than one pseudonym per user and
time-slot.
B. Pseudonymity through group signatures
Group signature (GS) schemes, similar to digital anony-
mous credentials, allow users to remain unidentifiable under
the anonymity set formed by the group members. Users in
possession of a group signing key can sign messages on behalf
of a group [27],[23], and these messages can be verified with
a group public key. GS schemes enable conditional privacy
since group members can include their encrypted unique public
keys or identities along with the signatures, which can be
later opened by a revocation manager. Also, GS-based systems
may integrate pseudonyms in the form of revocation tokens
[28],[13]. The main drawback of group signature schemes is
their complexity, mainly in the anonymity revocation process
which is the main bottleneck of this technology [29]. It is worth
mentioning the work in [13], where the authors propose a
GS scheme that includes embedded pseudonyms as revocation
tokens for a crowdsensing application. This work also caters
for a revocation mechanism whose complexity is sublinear
with respect to the number of revoked users, hence more
efficient than other GS-based counterparts. This work however,
like other GS-based schemes, only enables users to hold one
pseudonym at a time, and all signatures produced with the
same pseudonym are inherently linkable. Intuitively, it would
be possible to grant several credentials to each citizen [16] to
generate several unlinkable pseudonyms simultaneously, but a
user holding those credentials would be able to behave like
different users, hence the unlinkable-yet-accountable property
would not be provided.
C. Pseudonymity through public keys and symmetric keys
A Pubic Key Infrastructure (PKI) solution is simpler in
terms of revocation efficiency, and more convenient than previ-
ously referenced solutions in some scenarios such as in Vehicu-
lar Networks (VANETs). Some research works have proposed
that users can send signed messages using public key cryp-
tography, with the public keys representing their pseudonyms
[14],[30]. Some previous works on crowdsensing follow this
approach [6]. However, this approach requires a certification
authority to generate and distribute, and periodically renew,
a large number of public key certificates. These certificates
have also to be transmitted together with the signed messages.
A more lightweight solution is proposed in [31],[32], which
suggests a pseudonym-based authentication scheme based on
one-time passwords, where pseudonyms are generated with a
hash chain. Nonetheless, this approach requires a two party
protocol for pseudonym generation in both sides (the citizen
and the Smart City in our scenario), which must hold the same
secret key to derive the pseudonym set in both sides. It also
requires a periodic renewal of the pseudonym set.
D. Pseudonymity through identity-based cryptography
Identity based cryptography (IBC) [33] considers the user’s
identity as the public key, hence users can sign messages that
can be verified with their identities. Note that, as proposed by
[34], if the identity of the user is replaced by a pseudonym,
then the user can sign messages that can be verified with
that pseudonym. In this scenario, conditional privacy (i.e.
anonymity revocation in case of misbehavior) is still possible
when the CA issues both the secret keys and the pseudonyms
[35], or at least generates the secret key associated to the
pseudonyms [17]. It is also possible to generate both, the
secret key and pseudonyms in the user side, but such feature
must go together with an efficient manner to control the users’
pseudonym generation capabilities and to enable the revocation
in case of misuse. A possibility to control the pseudonym
self-generation is to require the pseudonyms to be signed by
a trusted third party [36], e.g. the CA. This signing process
by a CA can also be done blindly [37], which enables users’
privacy with respect to the CA. However, the requirement for
the interaction with a trusted third party to generate or certify
the pseudonyms can limit the scalability and the efficiency
of the system. Group signatures or ring signatures can be
used to address this scalability issue [38],[39], since the users
belonging to a group of legitimate users can generate their
own pseudonyms and corresponding private keys and sign
these pseudonyms with the group signing key. However, this
approach does not provide the desired property of unlinkable-
yet-accountabile pseudonymity. In general, the main limitation
for the application of current pseudonym systems based on
IBC in our crowdsensing scenario is that the schemes enabling
unlinkable pseudonym self-generation, e.g. [17],[38],[39], do
not prevent users from using several pseudonyms in the same
sensing task.
III. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIVACY-PRESERVING
AUTHENTICATION
We have exposed several technologies that can be used
to implement a pseudonym-based signature scheme to en-
able privacy-preserving authentication in crowdsensing. How-
ever, to be applied in a crowdsensing scenario, the adopted
pseudonym-based signature scheme should enable the follow-
ing features:
• Pseudonym self-generation: Users should be able to
generate an unlimited number of pseudonyms on the
user side with a single credential issued by the CA.
This feature limits the number of connections to the
CA which makes the crowdsensing system scalable.
• Efficient revocation: Given a pseudonym, the CA
should be able to compute the user pseudonym set
efficiently and to retrieve her identity. The system
should also rely on a revocation list that grows linearly
with the number of revoked users, or implement
a revocation mechanism that is tolerant to possible
delays in the revocation list distribution [40],[13].
• Backward unlinkability: The revocation should pro-
vide backward unlinkability (also referred as forward
unlinkability in some works [35]), i.e. a revoked
pseudonym should not be linkable to previous non-
revoked pseudonyms of the same user.
• All-or-nothing transferability: A legitimate user should
not be able to transfer a pseudonym to another
non-legitimate user and enable the recipient of the
pseudonym to generate valid signatures without en-
abling her to generate more pseudonyms and signa-
tures under the legitimate users’ behalf.
• Unlinkability-yet-accountability: All pseudonyms gen-
erated with the same credential and used for different
sensing tasks should not be linkable to each other.
However, all pseudonyms used for a specific sensing
task should be generated from different credentials.
It is worth highlighting that pseudonym revocation
should not be required, i.e. the CA should not be
involved to provide unlikability-yet-accountability in
the Smart City side.
IV. RELATED WORK ON PRIVACY-PRESERVING
CROWDSENSING FRAMEWORKS
The first proposed framework for privacy-preserving
crowdsensing, to the best of the authors knowledge, was
Anonysense [12] which already emphasizes the need for pri-
vacy preservation in both the network and application layers.
For the network layer the authors propose to obfuscate the
MAC and IP addresses with mechanisms such as [41],[42]. In
the application layer, they adopt a privacy-preserving authen-
tication mechanism that relies on a GS scheme, concretely the
scheme in [43]. However, this scheme does not provide any
concrete anonymity revocation mechanism and should only be
used in systems where unconditional privacy is desired. Also, it
does not integrate pseudonyms in the signatures, which yields
signatures from users unlinkable, hence it does not prevent
selfish users. As a result, this system is only effective in a
scenario that considers honest users.
Sppear [6] provides a system model that splits the crowd-
sensing architecture in several entities, and achieves privacy
even when several honest-but-curious entities within this archi-
tecture collude against the users’ privacy. Privacy-preserving
authentication is achieved through a GS scheme and PKI to-
gether. First a Group Manager (GM) provides a group signing
key (gsk) to legitimate users. Then users can use this gsk
to authenticate themselves towards an Identity Provider (IdP),
which enables a Pseudonym Certification Authority (PCA) to
provide pseudonyms to users in the form of public keys, with
their corresponding certificate and secret key. However, this
solution requires users to authenticate themselves towards the
IdP, using the gsk, to obtain new pseudonyms from the PCA
to perform unlinkable sensing tasks. Hence, pseudonym self-
generation is not provided. All-or-nothing transferability is also
not accomplished, since users can demand pseudonyms to the
PCA and transfer them to not legitimate users.
Groupsense [13] proposes a novel GS scheme, called
SRBE, that enables pseudonym self-generation in the user
side with a single credential from the CA. The scheme
proposes a slotted time-division where users can self-generate
a unique and unlinkable pseudonym in each slot. SRBE also
allows revocation with a complexity that is sublinear with




































respect to the number of revoked pseudonyms. This system
provides all mentioned features in sec. III, except for the last
one, unlinkable-yet-accountable pseudonymity. SRBE does not
enable users to hold several unlinkable pseudonyms per time-
slot, which is actually an open problem in GS schemes [13].
Although it is possible to grant users several credentials, hence
several pseudonyms per time-slot, then a selfish user could
participate in the same sensing task with several pseudonyms.
The work in [17] also provides a pseudonym-based signa-
ture scheme, based on IBC, for service oriented architectures
that is applicable to crowdsensing. It provides a mechanism
for users to self-generate an unlimited number of pseudonyms
from a single credential issued by the CA. The CA can
still track the self-generated pseudonyms and link them to
the stored credential of misbehaving users. However, this
scheme does not provide any control or limitation on the
pseudonym generation, which would enable sybil attacks from
selfish users. Also, revocation requires an on-demand search
on the users’ credentials with three pairing operations per
stored credential, which increases the time complexity of the
revocation mechanism. In the same work [17], authors propose
another signature scheme with pseudonym controlled variation,
which limits the pseudonym self-generation to one pseudonym
per time-slot. This scheme enables the pre-computation of the
users’ pseudonyms in the CA, which enables a fast revocation
mechanism. However, this second scheme does not provide
pseudonym unlinkability.
It is also worth mentioning some valuable proposals based
on homomorphic encryption for privacy-preservation in crowd-
sensing such as [44],[45],[46],[47],[48]. These works provide
elegant and efficient manners to aggregate data and calculate
reliability degrees from users while preserving users’ pri-
vacy. Also the work in [49], which provides a scheme that
enables complex arithmetic operations for data aggregation
and processing of encrypted sensing data. However, contrary
to our proposed scenario, these works adopt the honest-but-
curious user threat model, in which users may try to infer
other users’ information but do not have any motivation to
send faulty data to the data processing services, i.e. users
do not disrupt the proper functioning of the Smart City data
processing mechanism. Although it is a reasonable assumption,
the consideration of rogue users or malfunctioning sensing
devices should not be left unconsidered due to the relevance
that such data may have in the management of some Smart
City urban subsystems. In this scenario, when user misbehavior
(intentionally or not) is considered, the digital signing of
sensed data is key [44],[50].
Fig. 1. System model for the proposed pseudonym-based signature scheme.
V. SYSTEM MODEL
The proposed crowdsensing scenario considers the follow-
ing entities, also detailed in Fig. 1:
1) The Certification Authority (CA): is in charge of: i)
issuing credentials to users; ii) revoke the user privacy
rights, i.e. it can retrieve the real identity of a user
given her pseudonym; iii) distributing a revocation
list with all revoked pseudonyms.
2) The Verifier: is an Authentication Server (AS) in the
Smart City side. It is responsible for: i) authenticating
the sensing reports sent by users; ii) delivering the au-
thenticated sensing data to a data processing service;
and iii) issuing receipts to the users to acknowledge
their participation in the crowdsensing system.
3) The Data Collector: also referred to as data process-
ing service that receives authenticated sensing data
from the Verifier. It is responsible for: i) identifying
outliers or misleading sensing data and report it to the
CA to eventually trigger the revocation process; and
ii) planning the sensing tasks, i.e. it publishes the re-
quired environmental data and the incentive program
to foster user participation. For each sensing task,
the data collector enables a specific task index, hence
users can participate with their unique pseudonym of
such index value.
4) The users: are citizens provided with a valid creden-
tial issued by the CA and they can: i) self-generate
pseudonyms; and ii) sign the sensing data. The user
can self-generate a new pseudonym per each sensing
task by using the index value of such sensing task.
Users can participate in several sensing tasks simul-
taneously, i.e. providing data from different sensors.
It is worth commenting that we leave the incentive program
implementation out of the scope of the paper, and focus on the
privacy-preserving authentication aspect of the sensing data
delivery. Previous works such as [6] detail how this process
can be performed securely.
VI. THREAT MODEL
The threat model, also depicted in Fig. 1, considers three
different entities: i) the CA; ii) The Smart City including the
data collector and the verifier; and iii) the users (i.e. citizens).
The CA is an honest entity and independent from other Smart
City entities. Thus, the CA is legitimate to revoke users privacy
privileges in case of misuse, either by pseudonym revocation
or de-anonimization. The verifier and the data collector are
considered honest-but-curious entities, which means that they
may use the sensing reports and pseudonyms to locate and
profile specific users by linking the transmission of several
reports and GPS information to infer users’ activities. Finally,
users are considered dishonest and can perform several mis-
behaving actions: i) send faulty data unintentionally due to
a sensor malfunctioning; ii) send fake data intentionally to
disrupt service; or iii) send the same valid report several times
to maximize the benefit from the incentive program, i.e. using
two or more different pseudonyms for the same task (which is
considered a sybil attack).
VII. MAIN CONTRIBUTION OF PROPOSED WORK
The main contribution of this work is a pseudonym-
based signature scheme that enables users to self-generate
unlimited unlinkable-yet-accountable pseudonyms. The users
can generate a number of unlinkable pseudonyms to participate
simultaneously in several sensing tasks. Different pseudonyms
generated from a user cannot be linked to the same user, but
different pseudonyms from the same user cannot be used for
the same sensing task. This feature permits the Smart City
to control the number of participants in a sensing task and
protects the incentive system from selfish users. We achieve
this feature by embedding an index value in the pseudonym
generation and signing algorithms of the signature scheme,
which enables users to generate only one valid pseudonym
per index value. The correct construction of the pseudonym
and the signature can be validated by the verifier in the Smart
City side without any interaction with the CA.
Fig. 2. Algorithms of the proposed pseudonym-based signature scheme.
The security of the proposed signature scheme relies on
the k − CAA problem (sec. VIII-C3) proposed by [51], that
has also been followed by other signature schemes such as
[52],[53],[54],[55],[56],[57],[17]. The latter, [17], also pro-
vides a pseudonym-based signature scheme with the flexibility
to generate unlimited pseudonyms on the user side, as ex-
plained in sec. IV. In that construction, each pseudonym is
generated using a credential issued by the CA and a secret
key randomly chosen by the user.
In our proposed scheme however, the generated key on
the user side must fulfil a linear relation with the secret
key obtained from the CA and a random factor obtained
through a hash-chain. Such a hash-chain uses the index value
of each sensing task, which binds the pseudonym generation
process to each sensing task. The proposed signature scheme
is constructed from a zero-knowledge proof using the Fiat-
Shamir heuristic VIII-C, and the linear relationship between
secret keys is included in the proof of knowledge by means of
auxiliary keys (sec. VIII-D).
Additionally, the proposed scheme provides an efficient
mechanism to revoke pseudonyms that is based on pseudonym
pre-computation. This mechanism allows the CA to pre-
compute users pseudonyms (which does not require pairing
computations) to obtain a pseudonym list, and then perform
revocation with a binary search tree. It is worth highlighting
that pseudonym pre-computation would not be possible if users
were able to generate pseudonyms using randomly generated
keys [17]. Moreover, the paper provides a batch verification
mechanism, which is convenient in a scenario where the
signature verification process is centralised. The paper caters
for a detailed performance evaluation section, a formal se-
curity analysis and complexity analysis that shows a lower
number of pairing computations when compared with previous
pseudonym-based schemes proposed for crowdsensing.
VIII. PROPOSED SIGNATURE SCHEME
This section describes the operations of the proposed
pseudonym-based signature scheme, provides the mathemati-
cal preliminaries to understand the construction and the proofs
of security, and then provides the security definition and
security analysis.
A. Signature scheme algorithms
The algorithms are performed by three different kinds of
entities: i) Certification Authority (CA); ii) Verifier; and iii)
User. Also, the time is divided in time-slots, and the switching
between time-slots is synchronized in all entities. The signature
scheme is composed of the following algorithms, also depicted
in Fig. 2:
CA algorithms:
• KeyGen: The CA runs this algorithm taking as input
a security parameter K. The output is a set of public
parameters PP and secret key s.
• KeyGenTmp: The CA runs this algorithm taking as
input a time-slot value i. The output is a public time-
restriction key Wi.
• CreGen: The CA runs this algorithm to generate a
credential cred for a user with identity ID. The CA
stores the tuple (ID, cred) in a registry REG. The
user stores the credential secretly.
User algorithms:
• PseuGen: The user runs this algorithm, taking as input
the credential cred, the index of the pseudonym x, and
the time-slot value i. The index is provided by the data
collector when publishing a new sensing task, and it is
a public value. The output is a pseudonym pseux,i and
a secret value µ′. The CA can also run this algorithm
since it keeps the credentials in the registry REG
• Sign: The user runs this algorithm to sign an arbitrary
message M , with a pseudonym pseux,i, for the index
x and the credential cred in a time-slot i. The output
is the signature σ.
Verifier algorithms:
• Verify: The Verifier runs this algorithm. It performs
the following two sub-algorithms, and it outputs
”valid” if and only if both sub-algorithms output
”valid”:
◦ RevCheck: The algorithms returns ”invalid” if
RL constains the pseudonym pseu. It outputs
”valid” otherwise.
◦ SignCheck: Checks whether the signature σ
is correct for the message M , with respect to
the pseudonym pseux,i for the time-slot i and
index x.
B. Specific CA operations for conditional privacy
Additionally, the CA can perform the following operations
to enable conditional privacy, i.e. to be able to revoke users’
privacy privileges and track misbehaving users, which consists
of including some or all pseudonyms of the revoked user in the
Revocation List (RL). Such RL is transmitted to the Verifier:
• GenPseuList(REG, i,{x1, . . . , xn}): The algorithm
is executed before the activation of the time-slot i.
It generates the pseudonym list PseuL with all valid
pseudonyms of registered users for time-slot i and
index values {x1, . . . , xn}, where n is the maximum
number of pseudonyms per user, i.e. the maximum
number of planned sensing tasks.
• Open(pseu, i): If the pseudonym pseu is part of a
valid signature, then the algorithm returns the ID of
the user owning the pseudonym pseu.
• Revoke(pseu, i, {xi, . . . , xj}, RL): It revokes the user
owning the pseudonym pseu by including in the
RL the user’s pseudonyms with indexes {xi, . . . , xj}
where i, . . . , j ∈ [1, n]. The set of indexes must be
composed of at least one index, and a maximum of n.
C. Preliminaries
This section provides the mathematical background for
the understanding of the proposed pseudonym-based signature
scheme.
1) Bilinear Maps: Let G1 and GT be two cyclic groups of
prime order p, where the discrete logarithm problem is hard.
Let K be a security parameter that defines the number of bits
of p. Then e is a bilinear map [33], in the groups (G1, GT ),
e : G1 ×G1 → GT 2, if it satisfies:
• Bilinearity: ∀α,β ∈ Z∗p and P,Q,R ∈ G1, it
holds that e(αP + βQ,R) = e(P,R)αe(Q,R)β and
e(R,αP + βQ) = e(R,P )αe(R,Q)β .
2we provide the definition of a symmetric pairing since our implementation
uses a symmetric pairing configuration.
• No-degeneracy: There is at least one element Q ∈ G1
such that e(Q,Q) ∕= 1GT .
• Complexity: It is possible to compute efficiently the
bilinear map e.
2) ECDLP: Let G = 〈P 〉 be a cyclic group of prime order
p. Given a point Q ∈ G, then the Elliptic Curve Discrete
Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) states that it is computationally
intractable, in polynomial time, to obtain an integer n ∈ [1, p−
1] such that Q = nP .
3) (k,n)-CAA Problem: Let G1, GT be two cyclic groups
of prime order and e be a bilinear map defined as above. Let
P, P1, . . . , Pn ∈ G1, and let x, a1, . . . , ak ∈ Zp (where k
and n are integers;). As defined in [17], the Collusion Attack
Algorithm problem with k traitors and n examples, ((k, n)−
CAA), is defined as:
Given the set {xP, xPj |1 ≤ j ≤ n}, there is not any
polynomial time algorithm for obtaining 1(x+a)P for some
aPj ∕∈ {aiPj |1 ≤ i ≤ k; 1 ≤ j ≤ n} with no negligible
probability [51].
D. Pseudonym-based signature scheme construction
This section details the construction of the proposed
pseudonym-based signature scheme with unlinkable-yet-
accountable pseudonymity by extending the signature scheme
in [17]. The table II describes the different elements and the
algorithms from which they are obtained. In general, capital
letters are used for elements in the group G1 and low case
letters are used for elements in Z∗p and GT . Also, elements of
the form f() denote public functions. The term PP denotes
the set of Public Parameters. Bold values are secret values
while the rest are public values.
TABLE II. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ELEMENTS
Element Derived from Element Derived from
PP (P ) KeyGen PP (e()) KeyGen
PP (W ) KeyGen PP (H1()) KeyGen
CA secret key (s) KeyGen PP (H2()) KeyGen
time-rest key Wi KeyGenTmp PP (H3()) KeyGen
G1, GT , Z
∗
p KeyGen PP (T ()) KeyGen
pseudonym idx (x) user choice time-variant Qi H1(T (time))
cred secret (Su) CreGen signature (c) Sign
cred secret (µ) CreGen signature (s1) Sign
pseu secret (µ′) PseuGen signature (s2) Sign
pseudonym (Pu) PseuGen signature (s3) Sign
pseudonym (Pˆu) PseuGen signature (s4) Sign
signature (y1) Sign signature (s5) Sign
signature (y2) Sign time-slot (i) T (time)
KeyGen(1K) For a given security parameter K, the algo-
rithm selects a prime number p of K bits. Then select two
cyclic groups of order p, G1 and GT , such that it exists
a bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → GT , and such that the
ECDLP is hard in G1 and the Discrete Logarithm problem
(DLP) is hard in GT . Also, it picks two cryptographic hash
functions H1, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G13 and a hash function
H3 : {0, 1}∗ → GT . The algorithm selects a function T ()
whose input is a time value obtained from the system clock
and its output is the corresponding time-slot value i. The
algorithm runs at the CA side.
3As it is explained in [33], it is sufficient with a function H : {0, 1}∗ → A,
for a given set A, and an admissible encoding function L : A→ G1
The algorithm performs the following opera-
tions to generate the public parameters PP =
{G1, GT , Zp, P,W, g, h, e(), H1(), H2(), H3(), T ()} and
the secret key s.
1) selects to generators g, h R←−− GT such that the
discrete logarithm with respect to each other is not
known.
2) selects a secret s R←−− Z∗p
3) selects a generator P R←−− G1
4) computes a public key W = sP
KeyGenTmp(i,PP ) The algorithm runs at the CA and gets
as input a time-slot value i to generate a public time restriction
key Wi, which is transmitted from the CA to the Verifier before
the activation of each time-slot. The algorithm performs the
following steps:
1) computes the time variant parameter Qi = H1(i)
2) computes Wi = sQi
CreGen(s,PP ,ID) The algorithm runs at the CA and uses
the secret key s and public parameters PP to generate a
credential for a user. The CA runs this algorithm and sends the
credential cred = (µ, Su) to the user over a secure channel.
The user must authenticate first, and provide its real identity
ID. Although the value ID is not used in the credential
generation, the CA stores the tuple (ID, cred) in an internal
registry REG. The user can verify the correctness of the
credential by checking if e(µP +W,Su) = e(P, P ) holds.
1) selects µ R←−− Z∗p
2) uses the secret value s and computes Su = P 1(s+µ)
3) the credential is the tuple cred = (µ, Su)
PseuGen(cred,x,i,PP ): The algorithm runs at the user side
and requires a valid credential. It generates a pseudonym for
the index value x and time-slot i. The algorithm performs the
following steps:
1) computes the time-variant parameter Qi = H1(i)
2) sets d = Hx3 (T (time)), where H
x() results on
applying H() recursively x times, i.e. a hash-chain.
3) computes µ′ = (d− µ)/2 (mod p)
4) computes Pu = (µ+ µ′)Qi
5) computes Pˆ u = µ′Su
6) the pseudonym is the tuple pseux,i = (Pu, Pˆu)
7) the secret key associated with this pseudonym is µ′
Sign(cred,µ′,x,i,pseux,i,m,PP ) the algorithm runs at the
user side and requires a valid pseudonym (Pu,Pˆ u) with an
index value x, time-slot i, and the secret values Su, µ and
µ′. It outputs a signature for a given message m of arbitrary
length by performing the following steps:
1) computes the time-variant parameter Qi = H1(i)
2) selects random factors r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, γ, δ
R←−− Z∗p .
3) computes TG1 = r1Qi
4) computes t2 = [e(Qi, P + Pˆ u)]r2 .






6) computes t3 = hr3gr1 , t4 = hr4gr2 and t5 = hr5
7) computes the challenge4
c = H2(m||x||y˜1||y˜2||TG1 ||t2||t3||t4||t5||Pu||Pˆ u||Qi)
8) computes responses s1 = c(µ+µ′)+r1, s2 = cµ′+r2,
s3 = −cγ+ r3, s4 = −cδ+ r4, s5 = −c(δ+γ)+ r5.
9) The signature is composed by the auxiliary keys,
the challenge and the responses, i.e the tuple σ =
(c, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, y˜1, y˜2)
SignCheck(σ,pseux,i,i,x,Wi,m,PP ): The algorithm runs
at the verifier side and checks the validity of a signature of a
given message m, for a given pseudonym pseux,i of index x,
in a time-slot i. It requires the public parameters PP and the
time restriction key Wi. It performs the following operations:
1) computes the time variant parameters Qi =
H1(T (time))
2) computes d = Hx3 (i)
3) computes T¯G1 = s1Qi − cPu
4) computes t¯2 = [e(Qi, P + Pˆ u)]s2/e(Pu+Wi, Pˆ u)c.
5) computes t¯3 = hs3g−s1 y˜c1
6) computes t¯4 = hs4g−s2 y˜c2
7) computes t¯5 = hs5( y˜1y˜2gd )
c
8) checks whether the equality c′ = c holds, where:
c′ = H2(m||x||y˜1||y˜2||T¯G1 ||t¯2||t¯3||t¯4||t¯5||Pu||Pˆ u||Qi)
9) the algorithm outputs ”valid” if c = c′ and ”invalid”
otherwise.
E. Specific CA operations for conditional privacy
Independent from the signature scheme algorithms, the
proposed system requires the following operations to maintain
the datasets described in table III, which enable an efficient
anonymity revocation mechanism. Although the proposed sig-
nature scheme could provide anonymity revocation without
implementing the following operations, this would imply an
on-demand computation of 3 pairing operations in the CA side,
per revoked pseudonym and per stored credential, which would
be inefficient for the proposed crowdsensing application. The
efficiency of these operations is detailed in sec. 3.
TABLE III. CONDITIONAL PRIVACY ENABLING DATASETS
DataSet Updated Entries Holding Entity
REG CreGen {ID, cred} per user CA
PseuL T (time) {ID, pseu1,i, . . . } per user CA
RL Revoke pseuxi,i per revoked pseu CA, Verifier
GenPseuList(REG, i,{x1, . . . , xn}): The operation is
executed by the CA before activation of each time-slot
i. It takes the registry REG and uses the algorithm
PseuGen(cred,x,i,PP ) for each entry in REG for index
values in the set {x1, . . . , xn}. It creates the pseudonym
list PseuL with one entry per user of the form {ID,
pseui,x1 , . . . , pseui,xn}. Note that for this operation the CA
uses the same PseuGen algorithm as the user.
Open(pseu, i): It is performed by the CA. If the
pseudonyms pseu was part of a valid signature for time-slot
i, then this operation uses a binary search in the PseuL of
time-slot i to find the user identity ID.
Revoke(pseu, i, {xi, . . . , xj}, RL): It is performed by the
CA. It uses the Open(pseu,i) algorith to find the user ID, then
4where the operator || represents concatenation.
it retrieves the pseudonyms of the user from the PseuL and
updates the RL including the revoked user’s pseudonyms for
the specific indexes, i.e. {pseuxi,i, . . . , pseuxj ,i}. The RL is
sent to the Verifier.
F. Correctness of signature scheme
The signature scheme is correct, if and only if, for all
signatures σ of a message m, generated by a Sign algorithm,
with valid pseudonym and valid credential, the output of
Verify algorithm is always ”valid”, except fi RevCheck outputs
”invalid”.
Note that, given a valid signature σ =
(c, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, y˜1, y˜2) of a message m, with a pseudonym
(Pu, Pˆu) with index x, time-slot i, obtained from a
credential (µ, Su), and with a set of public parameters
(G1, GT , P, g, h,W,Wi, Qi), then c = c′ holds, i.e. the
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′−d) = hr5 = t5
It is worth commenting that this signature scheme, is
converted from a zero-knowledge proof using the Fiat-Shamir
heuristic. Concretely, in [17] the proposed ZK-proof is:
PoK{(µ, µ+ µ′) : Pu = (µ+ µ′)Qi ∧ v = v′µ′}
where v = e(Pu+Wi, Pˆ u)
and v′ = [e(Qi, P )e(Qi, Pˆ u)]µ
′
However, the scheme proposed in this paper extends this
PoK to include a linear relation between the values µ and µ′,
i.e. 2µ′ + µ = d.
PoK{(µ, µ+ µ′) :
Pu = (µ+ µ′)Qi ∧ v = v′µ′ ∧ 2µ′ + µ = d}
(1)
As described in [58], the linear relation of secret keys with
different bases can be proved using auxiliary keys, hence the
proposed PoK is transformed for practical reasons into:
PoK{(µ, µ+ µ′, γ, δ) :
Pu = (µ+ µ′)Qi ∧ v = v′µ′
∧y˜1 = hγg(µ+µ′) ∧ y˜2 = hγg(µ′) ∧ y˜1,2 = hγ+δ}
G. Security analysis
This section provides the security analysis of the proposed
pseudonym-based signature scheme by defining the unforge-
ability and the unlinkability-yet-accountability properties of
the scheme. To give some intuition: i) unforgeability ensures
that if a user outputs a signature that is flagged as valid, then
the user must have a valid credential; ii) unlinkability-yet-
accountability ensures that a user given a valid credential can-
not output two valid signatures with two different pseudonyms
for the same index value and same time-slot. It also ensures
that it is not possible to distinguish if signatures associated to
two different pseudonyms with different index values and/or
time-slot values were obtained from the same credential or
different credentials.
Unforgeability The pseudonym-based signature scheme is
said to be strongly existentially unforgeable under the adaptive-
chosen message attack if no probabilistic polynomial time
(PPT) adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in the
following game between the adversary A and a challenger C:
GAME 1:
1) Setup: C runs the KeyGen algorithm and obtains the
public parameters. C sends the parameters to A
2) Adversary Queries: A makes queries to C:
• credential queries: A queries a credential to
C, then C uses the CreGen algorithm and
returns a credential (µ, Su) to A.
• pseudonym queries: A presents a credential to
C, an index value x, a time-slot value i, and
queries a pseudonym to C. C runs PseuGen
and returns a pseuondym (Pu, Pˆu) and its
secret µ′.
• signature queries: A sends a message m, a
pseudonym (Pu, Pˆu), and the secret values
(µ′, µ, Su) to C. C runs the Sign algorithm
and returns σ to A
3) After a polynomial number of queries, A outputs a
signature σ on a chosen message m for a pseudonym
(Pu, Pˆu) that was never queried and which corre-
sponding secret values, i.e. (µ′, µ, Su) were never ob-
tained during the pseudonym and credential queries.
A wins the game if the SignCheck algorithm flags the
signature σ as ”valid”.
Theorem 1: In the random oracle model, and under the
adaptive chosen message attack, if a PPT algorithm has a non
negligible probability 󰂃 of breaking the unforgeability property
then there exists an algorithm C that breaks the (k,n)-CAA
assumption with an advantage 󰂃(k/qkey)qkey (n/qH1)
qH1 (1 −
(qH3/p)) considering a polynomial number of queries qkey ,
qH1 and qH3 .
proof: This proof follows similar steps as the proof in [17],
but adapted to the proposed scheme. First, let’s consider an
instance of the (k,n)-CAA problem as defined in sec. VIII-C3,
i.e. P, P1, . . . , Pn ∈ G1, and let x, a1, . . . , ak ∈ Zp (where k
and n are integers). Then C adopts the role of the challenger
in the GAME 1 and uses the adversary A as subalgorithm as
follows:
The challenger C computes the system public parameters
and sends the parameters to the adversary A. These parameters
include the public key W = xP and the time restriction key
Wi = xQi, where Qi = λiPiis obtained from the oracle H1
on input a time-slot value i.
Adversary Queries: The adversary A makes a polynomial
number of queries to C:
1) Credential Queries: The challenger C prepares a
polynomial number of responses for the credential
query {w1, w2, . . . , wqkey}, and the set {a1, . . . , ak}
is randomly distributed among these responses. When
A queries a credential, C picks a secret key ran-
domly within the predefined set, if such pick falls
within the set of {a1, . . . , ak} then C generates a
credential cre = (ai, Ai) = (ai, 1/(x + ai)P ) and
returns this credential to A. Otherwise, if the random
pick yields a value out of the set {a1, . . . , ak}, the
challenger aborts. The probability of not aborting is
(k/qkey)
qkey .
2) Pseudonym Queries : A presents a credential cred =
(ai, Ai) to C, then C obtains a random d from the H3
oracle and computes a′i = (d − ai)/2 and computes
Pu = (ai + a
′
i)λiPi and Pˆu = a
′
iAi.
3) Signature Queries: A sends a message m and
a pseudonym to C who returns the signature
(c, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, yˆ1, yˆ2) to A if the presented
pseudonym was previously queried. To compute these
values C uses the SignCheck algorithm and sets
the response of the oracle H2 to c, if this causes a
collision with a previous query to the oracle H2 then
C aborts. The probability of not aborting at this step,
taking into account that A makes qH2 queries to H2
oracle, and that the response of this oracle is random
in Z∗p , is 1− (qH2/p).
The challenger also defines the random oracles H1, H2 and
H3 as follows:
• H1 oracle Queries: C prepares a polynomial num-
ber of responses for {q1, . . . , qH1} and the sets{P1, . . . , Pn} is distributed randomly among them.
Then, when a value i is submitted to H1 the chal-
lenger C chooses randomly among the qH1 prepared
responses and replies to A. If the answer is in the
set {P1, . . . , Pn} then C picks randomly λi R←− Z∗p
and outputs λiPi. If the answer is not within the set
{P1, . . . , Pn} then the C halts and aborts this game.
Hence the probability of not aborting is (n/qH1)
qH1 .
• H2 oracle Queries: On any input of the form
(m||x||y˜1||y˜2||T¯G1 ||t¯2||t¯3||t¯4||t¯5||Pu||Pˆ u||ai) the
challenger C picks c R←−− Z∗p and responds.
• H3 oracle Queries: On any input of the form i =
T (time) the challenger C picks d R←−− Z∗p and re-
sponds.
Let’s assume that after performing a polynomial number
of queries, A presents a signature (c, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, y˜1, y˜2)
that is valid for a pseudonym (Pu, Pˆu). The challenger C
can verify if the credential of the presented pseudonym was
obtained during the credential queries by checking whether
e(Pu+Wi, Su) = e(Qi, P + Pˆ u) holds for any of the queried
credentials. If the credential was not queried, and the signature
is valid, for the Forking Lemma5 [59] the adversary will be
able to output another valid signature with the same inputs
but different challenge. This is, A will be able to present after
polynomial time another signature σ′ with the same auxiliary
keys (y˜1, y˜2) and commitments TG1 = T
′
G1
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5)) such that c ∕= c′, s1 ∕= s′1, s2 ∕= s′2,
s3 ∕= s′3, s4 ∕= s′4, s5 ∕= s′5.




⇒ s1Qi − cPu = s′1Qi − c′Pu⇒































= e(Pi, P )
(3)







(z1 − z′1)− (z2 − z′2)
(c− c′) Pi (5)
5According to the Forking lemma, if an algorithm can yield an output,
from some inputs obtained from a given distribution, and this output has
some property with non-negligible probability, then the adversary has a non-
negligible probability of producing another output with the same property
provided that the inputs are chosen from the same distribution.




(1−(qH3/p)) the advantage of C in
solving the (k, n)− CAA problem is not negligible.
Unlinkability-yet-Accountability: A pseudonym-based
signature scheme is unlinkable-yet-accountable if:
• given two pseudonym-based signatures with different
index value x and/or time-slot value i, there is no
algorithm deciding whether these two signatures were
obtained from the same credential or two different
credentials that is better than a random guess. This
feature in this kind of construction is straightforward
to prove.
Following the same reasoning as [58], all elements
in the signature are randomized, i.e. the commitments
(s1, s2, s3, s4, s5) are randomized with random factors
(r1, r2, r3, r4, r5), and the auxiliary keys (yˆ1, yˆ2) are
randomized with random factors (γ, δ). Hence it is not
possible to distinguish these elements from random
values obtained from groups Z∗p and GT respectively.
Also the challenge is obtained from a random oracle.
Similarly, as explained in [17], the pseudonym val-
ues (Pu, Pˆu), constructed as ((µ′ + µ)Qi, µ′Su), are
randomized with the factor µ′ and look like random
values in G1. Hence, only messages signed by the
same pseudonym can be linked to the same credential,
i.e. pseudonyms from the same user with the same
index value and time-slot.
• any PPT adversary A has a non-negligible advantage
in the GAME 2 between the adversary A and a
challenger C:
GAME 2:
1) Setup: C runs the KeyGen algorithm and obtains the
public parameters. C sends the parameters to A
2) Adversary Queries: A makes to C:
• credential queries: A queries a credential to
C, then C uses the CreGen algorithm and
returns a credential (µ, Su) to A.
• pseudonym queries: A presents a credential
to C, and an index value x, and a time-
slot value i, and queries a pseudonym to C.
C runs PseuGen and returns a pseudonym
(Pu, Pˆu) and its secret µ′ which is computed
as µ′ = (d− µ)/2.
• signature queries: A sends a message m, a
pseudonym (Pu, Pˆu), and the secret values
(µ′, µ, Su) to C. C runs the Sign algorithm
and returns σ to A.
3) After a polynomial number of queries, A outputs a
signature σ, and pseudonym (Pu, Pˆu) on the mes-
sage m for a credential cred = (µ, Su) that was
previously obtained in the credential queries, and
for a pseudonym index x and time-slot i that was
previously queried in a pseudonym query. A wins the
game if the signature is flagged as valid by the Verify
algorithm and the pseudonym is different than the one
returned by C in the pseudonym query.
Theorem 2 If a PPT adversary has a non negligible
probability 󰂃 of winning the GAME 2, then it exists an
algorithm C that is able to solve the discrete logarithm problem
in GT with no negligible advantage 󰂃.
proof This proof follows the steps given in [58]. Let us
assume that C is given an instance two random elements
g and h ∈ GT , for which the discrete logarithm a is not
know g = ha. Then the challenger C can use these values
as generators of GT in the Setup phase and use A as sub-
algorithm to compute a. This is, after performing the adver-
sary queries as defined above, A presents a valid signature
σ = (c, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, y˜1, y˜2) and a pseudonym (Pu, Pˆu),
for a index value x and time-slot i to win the above game.
The challenger C can verify that the presented pseudonym
was obtained with a credential obtained in a credential query
by checking whether e(Pu + Wi, Su) = e(Qi, P )e(Qi, Pˆ u)
holds for any of the queried credentials. Then C can verify that
the pseudonym for time-slot i and index value x was queried in
the pseudonym queries for such credential. Finally, C verifies
that the pseudonym returned in the pseudonym query does
not match the pseudonym presented by A. Hence, A has
obtained a pseudonym which secret value µ′ does not follow
the relation µ′ = (d − µ)/2. Then, for the Forking lemma,
A can obtain in polynomial time another valid signature with
the same commitments and auxiliary keys but with different









case we have that:
t3 = t
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Since s1 = c(µ + µ′) + r1, s′1 = c
′(µ + µ′) + r1, s2 =
cµ′+ r2 and s′2 = c
′µ′+ r2, then we have that if the equation
2µ′ + µ = d does not hold, the g-part of the above equation
does not vanish, and then it is possible to compute the discrete
logarithm of h with respect to g as follows:
logg(h) =
󰀗
(s′1 − s1) + (s′2 − s2)
c− c′ − d
󰀘 󰀗





In a crowdsensing application the verification process of
the signed sensing data is centralized in the AS that adopts the
role of Verifier, i.e. the signed messages are not transmitted
from users to other users, but to the AS in the Smart City
data processing service. Hence, it is convenient to provide
a mechanism where a large group of signed messages, from
different users, can be verified efficiently. Batch verification
provides such method. It consists of verifying a group of
signatures at once instead of verifying one by one sequentially.
The main advantage is that it reduces the computational cost,
the disadvantage is that if one only signature in the batch is
not valid, then the verification of the whole batch fails.
The proposed pseudonym-based signature scheme can be
slightly modified to enable batch verification. Such modifi-
cation was proposed in [60] for short identity-based signa-
tures, but it can be applied to our proposed pseudonym-based
signature scheme with some mathematical manipulation using
the pairing properties. This modification consists of increasing
the signature size by including the commitment that requires
higher computational costs to avoid its computation during
verification. The validity of this commitment is also verified,
but such verification is merged with that of other signatures
to reduce the number of pairing operations. Note that, in the
previously described SignCheck algorithm, the commitment
with higher complexity (i.e. involving pairing operations) is:
t¯2 = [e(Qi, P + Pˆ u)]
s2/e(Pu+Wi, Pˆ u)
c (11)
This value, computed in the Sign as t2, is included in the
modified signature, i.e. σ = (c, t2, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, y˜1,j , y˜2,j).
The batch verification algorithm for a group of N signa-
tures σj = (cj , t2,j , s1,j , s2,j , s3,j , s4,j , s5,j , y˜1,j , y˜2,j), with
corresponding pseudonym (Puj , Pˆ uj) of index xj , where
j = 1 . . . N , is performed as follows:
For each received signature, the AS:
1) Computes the time variant parameters Qi =
H1(T (time)) and d = H
xj
3 (T (time)).
2) Computes T¯G1,j = s1,jQi − cjPuj
3) Computes t¯3,j = hs3,jg−s1,j y˜
cj
1,j
4) Computes t¯4,j = hs4,jg−s2,j y˜
cj
2,j




6) Validates the signature if the equality c′j = cj holds,
where:
c′j = H2(m||xj ||y˜1,j ||y˜2,j ||T¯G1 || . . .
. . . t2,j ||t¯3,j ||t¯4,j ||t¯5,j ||Puj ||Pˆ uj ||Qi)
Note that the only difference between the above algorithm
and the SignCheck algorithm is the absence of computation
of the commitment t¯2,j , which is already included in the
signature. The validity of this value has to be checked as well,
but this verification can be done for all the signatures at once
by using the Small Exponents Test [61]. For that, the Verifier
generates N random values δj ∈ Zp (for j = 1 . . . N ) and
















Puj +Wi, (δjcj)Pˆ uj
󰀔 (12)
A. Batch verification correctness
It is trivial to see that this batch verification algorithm
performs the same validity tests as the SignCheck algorithm,
which has been proven secure in section VIII-G. It remains to
be shown that eq. 12 is equivalent to performing eq. 11 for the













































[e(Qi, P + Pˆ uj)]
s2,j
e(Puj +Wi, Pˆ uj)cj
󰀦δj
(13)
Removing the random values δj in both sides then we
have that eq. 12 is equivalent to performing eq. 11 for the
N signatures.
It is also worth commenting that in an optimal design of a
batch verification mechanism, the number of pairing operations
should be constant and not dependant of the number of signa-
tures in the batch [60][62]. In such a case, batch verification
can be cost-effective even in the presence of invalid signatures
[60], since techniques such as divide-and-conquer [63] can be
applied efficiently. However, in our proposed batch verification
mechanism the number of pairing operations is not constant.
The number of pairing operations for batch verification is N+1
(eq. 12), where N is the number of signatures. The proposed
mechanism reduces the number of pairing operations with
respect to the sequential performance of individual signature
verifications, which is 2N, but it is not resilient to invalid
signatures and it should not be used for large batch sizes.
Also, signatures of messages which sensing data fall out of
reasonable boundaries should be verified individually.
X. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
This section caters for a complexity analysis that com-
pares the proposed pseudonym-based signature scheme with
TABLE IV. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
Scheme algorithm e() Exp. G1 Exp. GT O()
Our Scheme
Sign 1 1 10 O(1)
SignCheck 2 2 11 O(1)
RevCheck 0 0 0 O(log2R)
Revoke 0 0 0 O(log2N )
PS [17]
Sign 2 1 1 O(1)
SignCheck 3 2 2 O(1)
RevCheck - - - -
Open 3 0 0 O(N )
SRBE [13]
Sign 3 5 3 O(1)
SignCheck 4 3 4 O(1)
RevCheck 0 0 0 O(log2R)
Revoke 0 0 0 O(log2R)
CLHZ [64]
Sign 5 5 5 O(1)
SignCheck 7 6 7 O(1)
RevCheck 0 0 0 O(R)
Revoke 0 0 0 O(1)
[13], which is the most recent GS scheme proposed for
crowdsensing. We also include in our comparison the scheme
[64], which data is obtained from the complexity analysis in
[13], and the pseudonym-based signature scheme from [17].
Table IV shows: i) the number of pairing operations e(); ii)
exponentiations in G16; and iii) exponentiations in GT . These
operations are more complex than the rest and dominate the
computational effort. Among these three kind of operations,
bilinear pairing operations e() are the most costly, hence these
are the ones that we aimed to minimize in our design. We
also express the complexity O() in terms of the number of
registered users N and revoked pseudonyms R.
The revocation complexity of O(log2R), with no exponen-
tiations or bilinear operations in both [13] and in our proposed
scheme, is achieved due to a revocation process based on
a binary tree search. A given pseudonym is looked up in a
pseudonym list which is binary sorted. Such list is precom-
puted by the entity with revocation rights, i.e. the GS in [13]
or the CA in our proposed scheme. Hence, the low complexity
of the revocation process comes at the cost of increasing the
complexity in the GS or CA for pseudonym list computation.
Fortunately, pseudonym computation does not require bilinear
operations (the performance evaluation in sec. XI details this
process). Other works such as [17] perform an on demand
search on the list of issued credentials, which requires 3 pairing
operations per credential. In this work authors do not formalize
a revoke algorithm, but detail the operations required to track
a user from a valid signature by iterating over the registered
credentials, which we include in table IV with the name of
Open algorithm. The efficiency of our proposed scheme, which
is shown in next section, is explained by a lower dependency
on bilinear pairing operations.
XI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The java library in [65] was used for the implementation
of the proposed pseudonym-based signature scheme and its
integration into our crowdsensing platform7. Namely, a type A
curve (y2 = x3+ax) over the field Fq with the recommended
settings in [66], i.e. the security parameters q and r are set
to 512 bits and 160 bits respectively. In this curve, G1 and
6Note that we use additive notation for operations in G1 throughout this
paper, hence exponentiation in G1 are depicted as multiplications between
Elliptic curve points and elements in Z∗p
7The experimental implementation (source code) is available for interested
researchers under request via email.
GT are cyclic groups of order a prime number of 160 bits
where elements are represented with 1024 bits and elements
in Z∗p are of 160 bits. The sizes of the different elements in the
credential, pseudonyms and signatures are shown in table V. It
is worth clarifying that the verification of a signature requires
the pseudonym values together with the signature, which sums
up to 7068 bits. The pseudonym index is an integer value of a
small bit number, and it can be implicit of the specific sensing
task.
TABLE V. SIGNATURE SCHEME ELEMENTS’ BIT LENGTH
Emement bits Emement bits
credential (Su) 1024 signature challenge (c) 160
credential (u) 160 signature response (s1) 160
pseudonym (Pu) 1024 signature response (s2) 160
pseudonym (Pˆu) 1024 signature response (s3) 160
pseudonym idx (x) 8 signature response (s4) 160
signature aux key (y1) 1024 signature response (s5) 160
signature aux key (y2) 1024 Message Overhead 7068
The computation time for the proposed signature scheme
was obtained by running the different steps of the cryptosys-
tem on a Intel Core i7 through 10000 iterations. The time
performance for pseudonym generation and message signing
operations are also tested in a Samsung Galaxy S6. The results
are presented in Fig. 3. The comparison between the time
performance for batch verification and individual signature
verification for the Intel Core i7 is given in Fig. 4. Batch
verification has been tested in the absence of invalid signatures.
It is worth commenting that the users generate pseudonyms
on-demand, by using the index value published by the data
collector entity for each planned sensing task. Similarly, the
message signing algorithm on the user side is only performed
when data is to be transmitted. Effective strategies out of the
scope of this paper are deployed to reduce the periodicity of
the data transmitted. Regarding the message overhead, it is
worth mentioning previous work that suggests the inclusion of
crowdsensing overhead piggybacked in phone calls [67].
The CA must be efficient in the revocation process, i.e.
identifying and excluding users in case of misbehavior should
require negligible time. Fast revocation requires and efficient
user identification and revocation list computation. In our
proposed system, the algorithm Revoke requires the execution
of the Open algorithm, which consists of a binary search on
PseuL, i.e. the list of pseudonyms. This binary search takes
a time in the order of milliseconds, which is negligible. The
PseuL list is pre-computed by the CA before the activation
of each time-slot. The pseudonym list is updated on-demand
when new users register in the system and recomputed before
every time-slot starts. Figure 5 shows the time required for the
pseudonym list computation for different configurations and
number of users.
The revocation list RL is obtained by indexing the revoked
pseudonyms in the list of all users’ pseudonyms, hence com-
putation and update times for the revocation list are negligible,
our tests yield values in the order milliseconds. This high
efficiency in the user identification and revocation process is
achieved at the cost of increasing the complexity of the CA,
since the pseudonym list computation for all registered users
in the CA is a time consuming operation, which imposes a
lower bound in the duration of the time-slots. The duration of
Fig. 3. Time performance in milliseconds in a Intel Core i7 and Samsung
Galaxy S6.
Fig. 4. Time performance for individual signature verification and batch
verification.
Fig. 5. Pseudonym list computation time in seconds in a Intel Core i7.
a time slot should be significantly higher than the pseudonym
list computation time.
It is also worth mentioning that to speed up the PseuL
computation in the CA, only the Pu value is computed in each
pseudonym, i.e. the Pˆ u value is not obtained. The Pu value is
unique for every pseudonym, hence it is sufficient to identify
a user in case of revocation of her privacy rights. Similarly,
when the RL is transmitted from the CA to the Verifier only
the Pu value per revoked pseudonym is included in the list.
These tests have been performed with and Android app and
Fig. 6. Snapshots of the Android app used for testing. From left to right: i)
the user is asked to sign in and obtains a credential; ii) the app generates a
number of pseudonyms; iii) the user selects a pseudonym and sends a signed
message to the Authentication server.
prototypes for both the CA server and the authentication server.
A snapshot of the Android application is presented in Fig.
6. Note that the pseudonyms are represented with chromatic
maps, i.e. a matrix of colored squares that codify the 1024 bits
of the Pu value of a pseudonym. This app was only used for
the testing of the pseudonym system, which is integrated into
the pilot described in sec. XII.
XII. PILOT IMPLEMENTATION
The European H2O R&I project, under the EUREKA-
CATRENE programme, seeks to develop human-centric se-
cure architectures to support the rapidly emerging wearable
computing for Smart City application domains. In this con-
text, several use cases have been defined focusing on key
practical application aspects, and crowdsensing forms part of
the envisioned use cases. A pilot based on this crowdsensing
use has been deployed in the city of Lisbon, Portugal, and it
is active since end-2018. This pilot counts with a working
prototype, which includes: i) a CA issuing credentials; ii)
users that register in the CA to obtain a credential to self-
generate pseudonyms and participate in the sensing tasks;
iii) a verifier that validates the signed messages from users;
and iv) a data collector that processes the data. The data
collector also publishes the different sensing tasks in which
citizens can participate. For that, the data collector publishes
the sensing data required (i.e. temperature, humidity, CO2
levels, etc.) and the specific pseudonym index that citizens
can use for participating in that task. Although an incentive
program should also be implemented such as [6], this has been
left for future work.
In this prototype the time-slot is set to 24 hours. Hence, the
pseudonym list PseuL and Revocation List RL are updated
by the CA on a daily basis or when a new user is registered
or revoked, respectively. The RL is transmitted from the CA
to the verifier when it is updated. The PseuL is generated
in the previous time-slot before its activation, which prevents
from synchronization delays that could enable revoked users
to submit data during the RL updates.
In this pilot a smartphone crowdsening application has
been developed and it integrates the proposed pseudonym-
based signature scheme. This application polls periodically the
wearable sensors for data, available on a wearable bracelet
that has a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) interface for com-
munication. The cloud back-end service stores the received
data in a specialized NoSQL time series database, InfluxDB,
and Grafana for data visualization. The authentication server
and CA are implemented into the same cloud server, although
located in separated entities. Figure 7 shows the current
implementation diagram of the current cloud server implemen-
tation. The crowdsensing mobile application, which is used as
gateway between the wearable sensors and the cloud server,
is developed using Google Android tools, namely Android
Studio and Android SDK. This application adopts similar
interface as the sensor manufacturer app [68], but including a
pseudonym selection panel. Figure 8.1 shows a snapshot of the
crowdsensing android application. The wearable device also
displays the sensing data or the current active pseudonym, as
it is shown in Fig. 8.2. Although in the current implementation
all the user side operations of the pseudonym-based signature
scheme are performed in the gateway, i.e. the smartphone, in
the future the operations involving the credential’s secret key
will be performed in a secure element already embedded in
the wearable device.
Fig. 7. Cloud server system architecture of the crowdsensing pilot.
Fig. 8. From left to right: i) crowdsensing mobile app user interface, it
displays the pseudonym selection pannel (bottom part) and the sensing data
(upper part); ii) wearable sensor device controller integrated into smartwatch
form factor, it displays the selected pseudonym.
The cloud server implements a graphical user interface
where the different measurements obtained from users are
located as landmarks. Figure 9 shows the the data submitted
by different users from a specific point of interest located in
Lisbon, Portugal.
XIII. CONCLUSION
This paper addresses the privacy issue of crowdsensing
in Smart Cities by proposing a pseudonym-based signature
scheme. The proposed scheme is scalable, since users self-
generate pseudonyms, hence it does not require users to trigger
periodic pseudonym or key renewal from the CA. Similar
to previous works this scheme also enables a time-slot divi-
sion where users pseudonyms are renewed. However, unlike
previous schemes the proposed pseudonym-based signature
scheme enables users to self-generate an unlimited number
of unlinkable pseudonyms while preventing selfish users from
using these pseudonyms for the same task. This feature is
convenient for crowdsensing applications since it enables users
to participate in several sensing tasks simultaneously, while
preventing the Smart City from linking different task participa-
tions to a single user. Also, it prevents users from participating
in a sensing task with more than one pseudonyms, which
could compromise the incentive program and could also have
a deleterious effect in the sensing data collection process.
Additionally, the proposed scheme requires less bilin-
ear pairing computations than previous schemes proposed in
crowdsensing applications. In fact, only one pairing operation
is required on the user side for the Sign algorithm. Hence,
the proposed scheme can be efficiently implemented as shown
in the performance evaluation section. Also, the proposed
batch verification reduces the time required for a centralized
verification up to 34% with respect to the proposed individual
signature verification. In addition, the pseudonym revocation
list is computed and renewed efficiently by indexing the list
entries into the full pseudonym list, which is pre-computed
before each time slot. Finally, the paper also shows how the
proposed mechanism can be implemented and integrated into
a real crowdsensing platform.
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